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The challenges the international fi nancial crisis poses for the Spanish economy
Address by the Director General of Economics, Statistics and Research, José Luis Malo de Molina, at the series of 
lectures on “Future economic challenges” organised by the Fundación Ramón Arreces in Madrid.
Let me thank the Fundación Ramón Arreces for the opportunity to take part in this series of lec-
tures on the challenges facing the Spanish economy. I shall be addressing a matter of vital impor-
tance, namely how the economy is faring in the midst of this serious global fi nancial crisis. In his 
inaugural lecture, Professor Rojo described the extent and depth of the present crisis, and the 
complexity and range of the challenges it poses for all aspects of the world economy. We are in 
fact facing an unprecedented contraction spiral worldwide. Financial turmoil of this kind presents 
a huge challenge for the future of the Spanish economy, and this is the subject of my talk today: 
the challenges the international fi nancial crisis poses for the Spanish economy.
All the economic data available confi rm that the Spanish economy is entering a deep recession, 
against a recessionary background worldwide. The INE fl ash estimate of GDP for Q4 released 
today shows a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of -1% in 2008 Q4. This being the second con-
secutive quarter of negative growth, that conforms to the technical defi nition of recession, and 
also highlights the intensifi cation of the contractionary phase that began last summer.
The limited data available on economic performance in 2009 to date point to a continuation of 
the same trends. Registered unemployment and Social Security contributions reveal the ongo-
ing deterioration of the labour market. 
The fi rst idea I want to convey to you, as the starting point and fulcrum for my talk, is that the 
current recession in Spain is the result of two processes that have unfortunately coincided in 
time. The crisis has dual origins. The fi rst is domestic, arising from the inevitable correction of 
the imbalances that had built up during the long period of economic expansion enjoyed by the 
Spanish economy since the mid-1990s on the back of the enormous benefi ts afforded by 
Spain’s convergence drive and its joining the euro in 1999.
The correction of these imbalances had been deferred owing to the expansionary fi nancial 
climate across the world in recent years, but had fi nally begun in 2006 and in the fi rst half of 
2007, before the onset of the current fi nancial crisis. The adjustment had at fi rst been gradual, 
and could in theory have been compatible with a soft landing and a moderate correction, had 
fi nancial stability prevailed internationally and had there been suffi cient external dynamism. In 
this setting, the Spanish economy could have counted on robust net external demand to offset 
the inevitable reining in of domestic demand, and on continued high volumes of the external 
fi nancial fl ows it needed, even in a scenario of adjustment. 
However, these hypotheses faded abruptly with the emergence and subsequent heightening 
of the international fi nancial crisis, which became the second origin or causal factor behind the 
present recession. The international fi nancial crisis introduced powerful global contractionary 
factors that superimposed themselves on the domestic adjustment factors, obliging the Span-
ish economy to combat the crisis under extraordinarily diffi cult conditions. Since then, there 
has been a feedback loop between the processes originated by the domestic adjustment and 
the international crisis, exacerbating the severity and complexity of the situation. The interna-
tional crisis has most forcefully impacted all the developed economies, irrespective of their 
domestic position. A case in point is Germany, which was on an expanding course following 
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the correction of some of its main domestic imbalances as the crisis hit, and which has now 
entered recession, along with everybody else. In the case of Spain, the prevalence of the inter-
national crisis should not mask the fact that its effects are coming on top of an adjustment that 
was in itself complex and costly. 
Both the domestic and international factors must be borne in mind if we are to make a correct 
diagnosis and identify the challenges ahead. From this starting point, I do not intend to focus 
on a description of the economic situation – those interested in this information may consult 
the latest quarterly report published by the Banco de España – but rather to analyse in depth 
some of the most salient features of the diagnosis and some of the main challenges facing the 
Spanish economy in this diffi cult situation.
As shown in Chart 1, between 1991 and 2006 domestic demand in Spain grew at a consis-
tently higher pace than GDP and incomes. As the chart also shows, the growth of expenditure 
in Spain considerably outpaced that in the euro area as a whole. In Spain, expenditure has 
systematically been beyond economic agents’ means, a situation that in economics cannot 
continue indefi nitely. Either future income generation responds to the expectations on which 
the expenditure decisions were based, closing the gap with higher growth, or sooner or later 
the level of expenditure becomes unsustainable and must be reduced. 
Interestingly, some of the factors behind the emergence of the international fi nancial crisis also 
contributed to the prolonged period of excessive expenditure in Spain. Specifi cally, the crisis is 
linked to continuous extraordinary fi nancial growth at an international level, based on the illusion 
that came to be known as “the Great Moderation” and that implied the existence of a series of 
factors that permitted rapid non-infl ationary growth, as if the economic cycle no longer existed, 
apparently justifying the pursuit of clearly expansive macroeconomic policies. And this, combined 
with a climate of easy tolerance, based on naïve trust in the self-regulating capacity of the mar-
kets, in a context of sweeping fi nancial innovation, led to enormous laxity in risk assessment. 
These international conditions helped sustain a pattern of excessive expenditure in Spain. 
The common monetary policy of the euro area may be said to have had a similar effect on the 
Spanish economy. The structural diffi culties hindering high growth rates in most of the core 
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euro area countries have infl uenced the common monetary policy, which has duly been large-
ly expansive; in the case of Spain, this has translated into a manifest easing of monetary and 
fi nancial conditions, which has been conducive to spending.
Excessive expenditure comes about when supply is unable to provide a suffi ciently fl exible 
response to demand-pull forces, despite population growth and the increase in the percent-
age of the population available for work, thanks to large-scale immigration and the growing 
share of working women. This insuffi cient supply-side responsiveness is linked to ineffi ciencies 
that persist in the Spanish economy, despite the transformations made, and to the low level of 
productivity. A complex question to which I will return later.
Low interest rates and their swift pass-through to fi nancial costs as a result of the predominance 
of variable-rate loans and the abundance of credit, against the backdrop of global fi nancial growth, 
permitted large-scale recourse to debt by households and fi rms to fi nance spending decisions. 
Spurring on such decisions were the stable macroeconomic conditions and rising growth expec-
tations in the euro area, and the lesser drainage of resources as a result of the reduction in the 
budget defi cit. As Chart 2 shows, household debt as a percentage of disposable income and 
corporate debt as a percentage of gross operating surplus have virtually tripled in less than ten 
years, making Spain one of the leading countries in terms of private-sector indebtedness. How-
ever, more than the level of indebtedness, which is always diffi cult to assess, the two most impor-
tant factors are the speed and the intensity with which it has grown. 
Much of the increase in indebtedness was justifi ed by the sounder fundamentals of the Spanish 
economy and the new opportunities this produced. However, as is often the case in econom-
ics, the movement went too far, surpassing levels that can be explained by fundamentals. 
Various Banco de España estimates show that the level of indebtedness assumed could only 
be justifi ed if Spain were to rapidly converge with the core euro area countries. And expecta-
tions of reaching the per capita income levels of the more advanced European countries in just 
a few years were unfounded in the light of the economy’s effi ciency and productivity.
Chart 3 plots the poor performance of both actual and total factor productivity in comparison 
with the euro area and the US. In-depth analysis of this question would be the subject for a 
lecture in itself; suffi ce to say there are numerous factors involved and various different expla-
nations. But what this poor performance does refl ect is that economic growth in Spain has 
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been based more on growth in the volume of economic activity and in levels of production, on 
the back of abundant unskilled labour and against a background of low fi nancial costs, than 
on advances in quality and effi ciency. This has exacerbated the consequences of excessive 
demand and indebtedness, and is a factor of weakness amid episodes of tension and diffi cul-
ties, posing a major challenge for continued future dynamism. 
As Chart 4 shows, unit labour costs, calculated by dividing wages by productivity, have sys-
tematically outgrown the euro area average and, to a greater extent, those of the most com-
petitive countries, such as Germany. Moreover, the increase in business margins has been 
driven by strong demand and by the lack of fl exibility in some markets for goods and, most 
especially, for services. Both factors, i.e. unit labour costs and higher margins, maintained 
persistent infl ation differentials with the euro area that have created problems of competitive-
ness and have intensifi ed the growing shift from domestic to foreign expenditure, thus widen-
ing the current account defi cit.
These wage formation and margin setting patterns reveal a lack of adaptation by economic 
agents to the requirements of euro area membership since, as the new currency is a common 
currency and devaluation is impossible, relative price adjustments are only possible by means 
of directly containing costs and margins. A particularly blatant example has been the use of 
infl ation-combating indexation clauses that led to wage rises of 5% on average in 2008, a year 
that closed with infl ation at 1.4% and with a sharp slide in employment levels (3% in Q4). 
Spain, Belgium and Cyprus are the only euro area countries in which these clauses are still in 
use, revealing a certain lack of confi dence in the ability to live with the rate of infl ation deemed 
to be compatible with price stability in the euro area. 
Spain presented four factors conducive to surging housing demand: dynamic population 
growth, fi nancial conditions, income expectations and the country’s attractive position for non-
resident buyers. However, over-reaction is a very common trend in the property market, as a 
result of the long investment maturation period, and this led to severe mismatches in terms of 
house over-valuation and over-production. Chart 5 offers a clear picture of the high price rises 
seen in the recent property boom and of the relative moderation and resilience of the subse-
quent correction, at least to date. The fi gures on the extent of the surplus production of homes 
during this cycle are also quite clear. 
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The real estate sector is the best exponent of the imbalances that built up over the extended 
period of economic expansion. We should not overlook the fact that all the imbalances are close-
ly interconnected and that they gradually undermined the foundations of economic growth, creat-
ing the conditions for a correction that was not only inevitable but also necessary, and which had 
in fact already begun before the emergence, in the summer of 2007, of the fi nancial turmoil that 
was to lead to the grave international fi nancial and economic crisis besetting us today. 
The scale of the global turmoil compounded the dynamics of the domestic adjustment, while 
at the same time amplifying its scope. As is well known, the Spanish fi nancial system was suf-
fi ciently protected from the bad practices that had fi rst created and then driven the fi nancial 
crisis, as is demonstrated by the non-existence of toxic fi nancial products in Spain and the 
resilience of Spanish fi nancial institutions, in contrast to the situation in most industrialised 
countries, where there have been numerous bankruptcies in the banking sector and major 
bail-outs. The position of the Spanish fi nancial system is very different and constitutes a factor 
of strength.
Nevertheless, the effects of the fi nancial crisis are not confi ned to the degree of direct expo-
sure to toxic fi nancial products or practices; instead they have become global and systemic in 
nature, in a dual dimension that is having a profound impact on the Spanish crisis.
On one hand, in the fi nancial arena the world has gone from a position of bold – and in some 
cases ill-conceived – expansion of fi nancial institutions’ balance sheets and proliferating fl ows 
of funds to a virtual paralysis of wholesale fi nancial markets and a generalised process of cor-
porate deleveraging, by means of balance sheet containment or contraction, to the extent that 
competition criteria would appear to have been inverted. There has been a shift from compet-
ing to achieve leadership by gaining size to competing to achieve the lowest possible level of 
leverage in the shortest possible time.
This radical change in scenario has seen a manifold increase in the losses of those institutions 
that had assumed most risk and has amplifi ed the generalised effects of the loss in value of 
THE EXCEPTIONAL SEVERITY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS WOULD 
SHARPLY IMPACT AN ECONOMY 
THAT HAD JUST BEGUN TO 
CORRECT A SITUATION OF 
EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURE
AND DEBT
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
 SPAIN
 GERMANY
EURO AREA
HICP
%
PERSISTENT PRICE AND COST DIFFERENTIALS CHART 4
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE, ECB and Banco de España.
a. Based on Spain's foreign trade weightings.
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
 EURO AREA (a)
 GERMANY
 SPAIN
UNIT LABOUR COST INDICES
Seasonally adjusted
1999 Q1 = 100
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2009 THE CHALLENGES THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS POSES FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY
fi nancial assets, raising many institutions’ solvency risks. The crisis on the international fi nan-
cial markets has become a global credit crisis whose effects are now making it more diffi cult 
for both households and fi rms to obtain credit.
The determined and exceptional measures taken by authorities worldwide have allowed us to 
sidestep the danger of a widespread collapse in depositors’ confi dence in the fi nancial sys-
tem overall, thanks especially to the extension of bank deposit guarantees and to the an-
nounced readiness to bail out ailing institutions. Nonetheless, the large-scale liquidity injec-
tions, the public guarantees of debt issues, the contribution of public capital and the 
acquisition of banks’ impaired assets have still not been suffi cient to halt balance sheet cor-
rections and restore normality to the fl ow of funds, which remains scant and burdensome, 
and which in some countries constitutes an added factor of economic contraction. Contrac-
tionary pressures persist in respect of credit and, in fact, continue to increase practically 
worldwide.
On the other hand, in the real economy, the extent of the crisis is having a profound and 
generalised impact, making for a global recession on an unprecedented scale that would 
have dragged the Spanish economy down whatever. On the latest IMF forecasts, all the 
developed economies are now either in or heading towards a major recession; in most 
cases, the most severe recession since the Second World War. The European Commission 
expects euro area GDP to shrink by 2 pp, affecting all the large euro area economies 
alike.
Both aspects have signifi cant repercussions on an economy that was immersed in an adjust-
ment. First, because they deprive it of the external support that it could have counted on in 
ordinary circumstances to offset in part the necessary cutback in domestic expenditure. Sec-
ond, because they heighten the impact on confi dence (see Chart 6) and precipitate expendi-
ture constraints beyond the level required by the domestic adjustment. Third, because they 
accentuate the need for economic agents to rapidly reduce their level of indebtedness in light 
of the radical turnaround in expectations, the increase in risk perception and the adverse fi nan-
cial conditions. And fourth, inter alia, because they severely constrain and raise the cost of 
external borrowing, on which both the availability of domestic credit and economic growth 
hinge, even in a period of adjustment. 
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As Chart 7 shows, credit is a strongly procyclical variable. During expansions it outgrows 
nominal GDP, while in recessions it grows at a slower pace. After a long period of rapid expan-
sion, in 2006 credit growth began to decelerate, in step with the cyclical downturn. As we saw 
in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, in economic downturns credit tends to grow 
below the rate of nominal GDP.
On this occasion the change is taking place against the backdrop of an unprecedented global 
credit crisis, so it is heightened by a series of factors: the sharp rise in the cost of borrowing; 
the dramatic reduction in borrowing demand as a result of the deterioration in both confi dence 
and expectations; and a more restrictive attitude on the part of fi nancial institutions in line with 
the increase in risk aversion and the deterioration in the perceived solvency of borrowers, as a 
result of the scarcity of funds, exacerbated by the high degree of independence of the whole-
sale fi nancial markets and fi nancial institutions’ need to reduce the degree of leverage to 
strengthen their fi nancial position.
The credit adjustment is being aggravated by the exceptional conditions generated by the 
crisis and may be becoming in itself an additional factor of contraction.
As in other countries, the measures taken to alleviate the effects of the international fi nancial 
crisis have enabled Spain to avoid the manifest risks of collapse of the fi nancial system that 
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emerged in early autumn 2008. The creation of the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets 
and the granting of guarantees for new debt issues are helping to alleviate the restrictive 
effects of the crisis on fi nancial institutions’ funding. Capitalisation levels continue to afford 
some room for defence. Nevertheless, it is very diffi cult to prevent the extreme fi nancial pres-
sures experienced at the international level, in the form of a general tendency towards risk 
reduction, from placing further restrictions on credit availability to households and fi rms, which 
could in turn further hamper their willingness to spend.
The most immediate effect of the international crisis has been the intensifi cation of the cor-
rection in the real estate sector, as housing demand has slumped. This has coincided, as 
a result of the time delay in the housebuilding cycle, with a record number of housing com-
pletions. In 2008 the number of housing completions was again at an all-time high, up 3% 
on the previous year, while housing starts fell by more than 60%. The surplus supply ac-
cumulated brought house price rises to a halt and prices began to decline after having 
risen very sharply in previous years. Above all, however, there was a dramatic reduction in 
housebuilding activity, which gave rise to a very sharp drop in employment. Employment in 
the construction sector fell by 20% in 2008 Q4 and the number of unemployed in the in-
dustry climbed by more than 150%. Overall, the employment adjustment is being felt more 
severely in Spain than in other countries and than in previous recessions (see Chart 8). This 
refl ects the persistent rigidities of the Spanish labour market, which are helping spread 
rather than contain the economic contraction; moreover, the impact on consumption is be-
ing amplifi ed by the high level of household debt. All domestic demand components are 
feeling the dual impact of the global recession and domestic adjustment in particularly ad-
verse circumstances.
The main determinants of the economic situation described point to a prolongation of the 
contractionary trends, in a setting in which it is very diffi cult to forecast the intensity and dura-
tion of the current recession. Lower interest rates and their rapid pass-through to all agents, 
given the predominance of variable-rate debts, together with the lower oil prices and the fall in 
the infl ation rate, which for the fi rst time has dropped below the euro area average, may be 
expected to act as a source of relief and to provide for escape routes. In any case, for the 
purposes of this talk, rather than discussing short-term forecasts, I believe it will be more use-
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ful to outline the key challenges facing the Spanish economy, with a view to exiting the reces-
sion as soon as possible and in the best possible conditions.
The international fi nancial crisis is a major external determinant over which we have little con-
trol. The global situation is highly complex, due to the feedback loop between the fi nancial 
crisis and the global recession and, as Professor Rojo explained in the inaugural lecture, past 
experience shows that digesting an episode of this kind takes time. We do not know how long 
the effects of this crisis will last in Spain, or the extent of the impact. But within this uncer-
tainty one particular challenge is to ensure that the soundness of the Spanish fi nancial system 
is preserved. The emergence of the fi nancial crisis found the Spanish fi nancial system in a 
relatively advantageous position, which has provided it with a good degree of resilience. Yet 
we should not overlook the fact that the adverse fi nancial conditions and global macroeco-
nomic deterioration will tend to erode this soundness and stability. Despite its sound starting 
point, the fi nancial system is not immune to such dangerous developments as those currently 
being witnessed.
The arsenal of measures taken in Spain is similar to that seen in all the developed economies 
and is being used in accordance with the specifi c characteristics of the Spanish fi nancial sys-
tem. These are exceptional measures, in keeping with the gravity of the situation, aimed at 
alleviating pressures at fi nancial institutions and creating conditions for credit to fl ow more 
freely. 
It is essential that the stability of the fi nancial system should not become a hindrance when the 
international crisis fi nally starts to unwind and the foundations are in place for the start of the 
recovery. The strength of the Spanish fi nancial system must be maintained, not only from the 
standpoint of fi nancial stability but also so as to enable Spain to emerge from recession and 
create sound bases for recovery. How this challenge is met will be key to ensuring that the 
economy can count on the appropriate funding. The soundness of fi nancial institutions and 
prudence in the assessment and assumption of risk are essential for restoring credit fl ows. If 
the fi nancial system were severely debilitated, as has happened in other countries, restarting 
the fl ow of fi nance in the economy would be even more diffi cult and growth would be im-
pacted to a greater extent.
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The serious deterioration in confi dence and the feedback of contractionary trends in spending 
warrant the adoption of expansive demand-side policies along the lines of those adopted at 
the G20 summit in Washington and by the Eurogroup in Paris. This is the stance adopted by 
monetary policy in the euro area; as infl ationary risks have diminished, interest rates have been 
cut by 225 bp since the autumn and operational procedures have been set in place to ensure 
all liquidity demands are met. This policy should act as a stimulus for the economy, especially 
as the intermediary functions of the credit system return to normal and the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism is restored. 1-year EURIBOR has now dropped by more than 300 bp, 
and this will pass through not only to the cost of new lending transactions but also to most of 
the fi nancial burden borne by households and fi rms, due to the predominance of variable-rate 
mortgages and loans. Although it will be impossible to return to the accommodative fi nancing 
conditions enjoyed before the crisis, the lower interest rates effectively paid by households and 
fi rms will offer signifi cant relief.
Fiscal policy also has an important part to play in offsetting the weakness of private expendi-
ture, by means of well-chosen expansionary measures to halt the spread of the recession and 
protect the worst-hit sectors. These measures should also be transitory, to ensure they are 
compatible with the maintenance of budgetary stability in the medium term; if not, there is a 
risk that the adverse effects on long-term interest rates, market confi dence or expectations of 
future tax increases may sterilise their positive impact on growth. The margin for manoeuvre in 
each individual country is very different, as a result of different starting points and different 
public revenue and expenditure profi les. Spain was running a budget surplus in 2007, but the 
economic turnaround and the measures taken to combat the recession transformed this sur-
plus into a defi cit in excess of 3% in 2008. Such a swift change may lead to a doubling of this 
fi gure in 2009, and it refl ects, inter alia, the high sensitivity of public revenues to the real estate 
sector and the economic cycle, and how signifi cantly rising unemployment and the growing 
cost of unemployment benefi ts are affecting the behaviour of the Spanish economy. The room 
for manoeuvre is, therefore, very limited and any measures adopted must be taken bearing in 
mind the risk that would be faced if, due to a rapid deterioration of public fi nances, budget 
consolidation measures were required that would have a contractionary effect on an economy 
still trying to fi nd its feet.
When there is no possibility of resorting to exchange rate depreciation, losses in competitive-
ness must be absorbed either by genuine productivity gains based on improved effi ciency or 
by improved relative costs.
To improve relative prices, agents must adapt their habits and behaviour to the standards re-
quired for successful participation in the euro area, and this has not been fully the case. The 
recent decline in infl ation, which for the fi rst time has dropped below the euro area average, 
represents an opportunity to redress this process. Maintaining cost infl ation below that of our 
competitors in the euro area forms part of the necessary adjustment and will enable us to 
secure enhanced competitiveness on which to base the recovery. 
This is one of the negative distinguishing features of the present economic situation in Spain, 
and one that may take unemployment to very high levels, making it more diffi cult for Spain to 
ride out the crisis. The Spanish labour market has a number of characteristics which cause no 
problems when the economy is in expansion but which intensify job destruction in periods of 
recession, forcefully amplifying contractionary trends. Current hiring and collective bargaining 
arrangements still suffer from the rigidities that prevent an appropriate response in the form of 
wage fl exibility, meaning that the bulk of the adjustment is operated through job losses. Against 
this background, reforms remain necessary to improve the relationship between job fl exibility 
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and job security. This is unsatisfactory at present as the employment protection mechanisms 
for some groups generate signifi cant job losses in the economy as a whole and reduce hiring 
incentives. Urgent measures are particularly important here in the present circumstances in 
which sectoral mobility and wage fl exibility may help alleviate both the extent and the duration 
of the recession. To staunch job losses and halt the attendant amplifying effect on the reces-
sion, adopting exceptional transitory measures to maximise the incentives for maintaining and 
hiring workers would even be justifi ed.
Crisis-combating measures must be consistent with the reallocation of resources between 
sectors that the economic adjustment requires. Other productive sectors must take up the 
baton from the role played by the real estate sector. The conditions of the Spanish economy 
guarantee that the real estate sector will play an important role in both the medium and long 
term, assisted possibly by immigrant labour, acting as a source of potential growth. But before 
even contemplating a reactivation of this sector, the surplus production accumulated must be 
absorbed and the sector restructured and downsized. Moreover, future steps will be needed 
to prevent such excesses from recurring. 
Accordingly, recovery will involve setting in place the fl exible conditions and incentives that will 
allow for the emergence of activities in which the economy has comparative advantages in 
terms of factor endowment and greater relative effi ciency.
From this viewpoint, structural reforms and productivity-enhancing measures are the key in-
struments available to the authorities to effectively shorten the recession and set in place the 
conditions for a recovery in line with the economy’s high growth potential in the long term, 
whilst avoiding the risk that being trapped in a protracted period of weak growth and high 
unemployment would entail.
And on that note I conclude. The serious global crisis has impacted the Spanish economy with 
force just as it was entering a complex adjustment process, giving rise to a severe recession. 
How we exit the recession will depend to a great extent on international developments that are 
beyond our control; but it will also depend, when the international situation returns to normal, 
on how the Spanish economy has withstood the major challenges posed that I have endeav-
oured to set out here.
12.2.2009.
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